Brexit is likely to have a significant impact on the environment. In the current article I argue against seeing the traffic as all one-way. While there was a temptation for the advocates of staying in the European Union (EU), in the context of referendum campaigning, to portray the United Kingdom (UK) as a laggard pressured into positive environmental performance by the EU as leader, the reality is that the UK has also strengthened the EU's environmental policy in some areas and seen its own weakened in others. Influence in both directions has also varied over time. The article goes on to consider core 'Leave' arguments around sovereignty and 'taking back control', exploring the implications of these in the specific context of environmental governance. In discussing subsidiarity, it concludes that leaving the EU will not remove the need for the pooling of some sovereignty over environmental matters at international level and, in the context of devolution, at UK level.
INTRODUCTION
There have been a number of excellent, comprehensive studies on the environmental implications of the United Kingdom (UK) leaving the European Union (EU), often referred to as 'Brexit'. 1 Detailed as these existing studies are, they do not always systematically set out the dynamic interaction between the UK and the EU, with influence -both positive and negative -travelling in both directions over time and across different policy areas within environmental policy. Nor do they necessarily unpick the various factors which have a bearing on any assessment of whether leaving the EU is likely to be environmentally deleterious. In the current article I aim to do both of these.
The article consists of two parts. In the first part, I consider the potential impact of Brexit on environmental policy and hence environmental quality. While this part considers the potential practical consequences, the second then considers the normative consequences of Brexit for issues of sovereignty and control -issues which featured strongly in the referendum debates. I argue that subsidiarity is central to the discussion and that repatriating environmental competence will typically fail to produce the desired level of effective control over environmental problems. I also highlight, as others have, that environmental sovereignty, once returned from 'Brussels', gives rise to questions about environmental federalism within the UK and the appetite of devolved administrations for a degree of Brussels-replacing central control. Both parts of the article therefore concern the title's 'impact of Brexit on the environment': the first part covers environmental policy and quality; the second part relates to environmental governance.
In deciding whether Brexit is likely to be good or bad for the environment in policy terms, it is important to note that any such assessment is inevitably value-laden. Although Table 1 below presents a form of ledger of positive and negative aspects of Brexit, the discussion that follows illustrates that there may be room for reasonable disagreement on where a policy is placed.
Different sides may be equally committed to environmental protection, but have competing visions of the best policy means for achieving this. 2 The EU emissions trading system (ETS) is a good
example. To what extent one regards the ETS as a force for good is likely to depend in part on one's faith in market-based instruments. Moreover, while this article mostly focuses on the potentially environmentally deleterious impact of Brexit on the specific policy areas that constitute the EU's environmental acquis, it is also worth observing that some believe the very nature of the EU as a growth-based trading block as a whole is environmentally harmful and that the UK would therefore be better off out. 
MULTI-DIRECTIONAL EFFECTS
2 E.g., the UK Environment Secretary, Michael Gove, has stated: 'While the EU has often been a force for good in raising environmental standards, some of the means haven't necessarily been the most effective regulatory tools -so getting those right will be critical to Brexit success' (R. Harrabin, 'Brexit 'Will Enhance' UK Wildlife Laws -Gove', BBC News, 19 June 2017, available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-40331919. 3 E.g. J. Jones, 'The EU is an Outsized Behemoth Beyond Reform: The Green Case for Brexit', The Guardian, Comment is Free, 8 June 2016, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jun/08/eureform-green-brexit: 'The most profound weakness of the EU, from the Green point of view, is that it is a super-sized top-down dogmatic project of endless industrial development and growth. It fosters the pointless carting of goods enormous distances, and it smashes local resilience and self-reliance. Often well-intentioned environmental policies are outweighed at every turn by the more fundamental drivers of its bid to turn the whole of Europe into a paradise for (environmentally damaging) agribusiness and industry.' The Green Party itself was in favour of Remain (being more concerned with the threat of Brexit to the environmental acquis): Green Party, 'Natalie Bennett Unveils Our "Three Yeses" to Europe', 23 Jan. 2013, available at: https://www.greenparty.org.uk/news/2013/01/23/natalie-bennett-unveils-our-three-yeses-to-europe. Table 1 is designed to show the interaction between the UK and the EU in environmental policy in a bi-directional and bi-dimensional manner; one which shows that the impacts have not all been one way, and have not been uniformly positive or negative, but rather a mix of both. 4 In the campaigning and debate leading up to the EU referendum, the Remain side typically emphasized the ways in which the EU had been good for the UK environment and that leaving would therefore be harmful.
contained within, such as drinking water, bathing water and waste policy, where EU Directives have undoubtedly led to significant improvements in UK standards. A number of Remainers did however also mention the few EU policy areas in the bottom left hand box which have not necessarily been environmentally beneficial for the UK, including in particular the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). 5 The CAP, for example, has gone hand in hand with an intensification of agriculture and has been associated with, inter alia, a decline in previously common farmland birds and diffuse nitrate pollution of watercourses from fertilizers. 6 In that respect, it can be argued that non-environmental EU policy 7 has had as much, if not more, of an effect on the quality of the UK environment as dedicated environmental policy. An assessment of the effects of Brexit on the environment, therefore, should not be limited to a consideration of environmental law and policy alone.
Understandably in a referendum aimed at persuading UK voters, the effects of UK membership on the EU received less attention. However, in assessing the overall effects of Brexit on the environment, these effects -set out in the top half of Table 1 -also require careful consideration as part of a bi-directional assessment. Some have been positive. For example, the UK has driven the EU on climate change targets 8 and has encouraged the greening of the CAP. 9 It was also instrumental in the design of the Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC) industrial emissions regime, 5 See also, e.g., biofuels, where EU policy has been questioned on environmental grounds both by those on the Leave side (see, e.g., dissenting report by P. Lilley, EAC, n. 1 above) and by the environmental movement (see, e.g., G. Monbiot, 'These Brexiters Will Grind Our Environment Into the Dust', The Guardian, 20 July 2016, available at:https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jul/20/brexiters-make-britain-countrysidelike-kansas). 6 Burns et al., n. 1 above, p. 37. 7 Although, of course, EU agricultural policy has for some time contained agri-environmental policy within it (albeit of questionable overall ambition Ministers. Some of the policy areas listed in Table 1 provide a good illustration of this. For example, the EU ETS could legitimately be placed in either the 'EU policy diluted' or the 'EU policy strengthened' box. Insofar as the UK pushed for this policy in the first place 16 and it has become regarded by many as a somewhat ineffective neoliberal instrument, 17 it might legitimately be put in the negative top left hand box. However, the UK has also been instrumental more recently in trying to strengthen the policy by restricting allowances, 18 which could mean UK influence belongs more in the positive top right hand box. Similarly, while the UK was an early advocate of nature conservation laws and was thus supportive of the Habitats Directive 19 at the time of its inception, 20 in recent years the UK Government, arguably, has come to regard the Directive as a burdensome obstruction to development projects. 21 As regards the EU's changing stance vis-a-vis the environment, the current Juncker-led EU Commission, for example, worried some environmentalists with its Better
Regulation-based 'fitness check' of the Birds 22 and Habitats Directives. 23 The dynamic nature of the EU-UK environmental relationship requires consideration not only of the past and present but also to the future. In the lead-up to the referendum, the future direction of the UK Government's environmental policy was undoubtedly a cause of concern in some quarters. environmental acquis, albeit not immobile, is relatively unmoving. The UK capacity to change postBrexit, in turn, is perhaps more constrained in practice than some might expect.
FUTURE RELATIONSHIP MODEL
Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) provides for a two-year negotiation period once the UK government has triggered the Brexit process by formally communicating its intention to leave, which it did at the end of March 2017. The aim is for the UK and the EU to come to an agreement within this two-year period, at which point the UK will cease to be an EU Member State.
If such an agreement cannot be reached then, under Article 50 TEU, the UK will drop out of the EU at the end of the period, unless the other 27 Member States unanimously agree to an extension beyond two years. While any agreement arising from this process is expected to include the terms of the 'divorce' -how resident EU citizens, EU staff pensions, existing UK budget contributions, assets and so on are to be dealt with -to what extent it will also include the terms of the UK's future relationship with the EU remains less clear. There is a view that it may be impractical to cover both the divorce and future relationship within the two year negotiation period and that the future relationship will therefore be left to a separate, 'mixed agreement'. In addition to European Parliament consent, this would require ratification by all EU Member States in accordance with their own constitutional arrangements (as with, for instance, the recent EU-Canada CETA bilateral trade deal). 40 The UK government has nevertheless expressed the hope that an Article 50 TEU agreement would cover both issues. This would secure the twin advantages of requiring only qualified majority voting by the Council (and the consent of the European Parliament) for its approval and avoiding a damaging gap period during which, in the absence of a future relationship agreement or a transitional arrangement, the UK's relationship status with the EU could fall back on World Trade 52 since UK manufacturers will most likely wish to continue to export to the single market. 53 There would inevitably be pressure to harmonize relevant UK standards with those of the EU. Hence, even after leaving the EU, the UK could still find itself in a position where its environmental policy is strengthened by the EU. However, for environmental and climate targets and associated process standards, the influence of competition from the single market could also be negative. If the EU adopts weaker standards than the UK, then the latter may find it hard to subject its own industries 54 to unilateral stringent targets which could harm their competitiveness when compared with the weaker EU rules facing their rivals. In this case, even after leaving the EU, the UK could still find itself in the bottom left box in Table 1 , with its environmental policy weakened by the EU. Thus, even after a hard Brexit, the single market's continuing influence on UK environmental policy means that the UK will still be affected both positively and, potentially, negatively. However, regardless of whether a soft or hard Brexit is pursued, the scope for the UK to continue to influence EU environmental policy will be severely curtailed.
CAUSATION
51 As well as, in some instances, process standards (where the EU exerts extra-territorial control over process standards in relation to products that want access to the single market It is also worth pausing to consider the often mentioned 'fall-back' impacts of international law in terms of the causal relation between EU influence and UK impact in Table 1 . Areas where UK environmental policy has been strengthened by the EU, identified in the bottom right box of the effectively enforceable as EU law. It cannot therefore be said that but for EU membership those areas of environmental policy would be completely jeopardized, because the UK's international obligations will still exert a protective effect, albeit a lesser one.
DEVOLUTION
The current section on devolution assumes that the UK will have a common, single future relationship model with the EU, as opposed to one that varies internally with, for example, Scotland remaining an EU member, or perhaps a member of the single market, while the rest of the UK leaves. 70 To the extent that environmental policy is a devolved matter in the UK, there are currently some differences in policy and performance across the various constituent parts of the UK, 71 but these differences are kept in check to a considerable degree by common EU standards across many areas. 78 However, these arrangements fall short of the political and legal accountability mechanisms that the UK has become used to through EU membership. In the end, leaving gives rise to concern not just about the future quality of environmental legislation, but also about the opportunities for citizens and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to hold the government to account. Domestic judicial review will of course still be available, 79 but civil society could lose its ability to hold government to resilient environmental standards. One of the core strengths of EU environmental law is the idea that it represents a credible long-term commitment which cannot be changed at the whim of individual governments just because, for example, they are struggling to meet existing targets.
The extent to which Brexit would produce an enforcement gap depends in large measure on the future relationship model eventually adopted. This is true of both public enforcement by the 78 Lee, n. 75 above, answers to Q. 9. 79 The House of Lords European Union Committee report, n. 35 above, which noted witness concerns that 'existing domestic judicial review procedures may be inadequate and costly' (para. 84). Improved access to justice is thus likely to be a necessity post-Brexit.
ability to impose financial penalties on recalcitrant states. 80 The only recourse consists of a second appearance before the EFTA Court. This same arrangement applied in the EU before the introduction of penalty payments and lump sums, and was considered unsatisfactory. As for private enforcement, in EEA law there is still indirect effect 81 and state liability 82 but there is no direct effect 83 and no principle of supremacy. 84 These latter two doctrines in particular have been central to the ability of citizens and NGOs to mobilize EU law effectively in their national courts.
BREXIT, SOVEREIGNTY AND CONTROL
While the first part of the article considered the potential practical consequences of Brexit for environmental policy and quality, principally in the UK but also more broadly within the EU, the second part examines the normative consequences of Brexit for issues of sovereignty and control.
The principle of subsidiarity -which involves consideration of and justification for which geographical level of action is best suited to particular areas of policy -is very much at the heart of these debates.
Arguably the most powerful narrative put forward by the Leave campaign during the referendum campaign was one of 'taking back control' and restoring sovereignty to the UK 85 -both having supposedly been lost to 'unelected bureaucrats' in 'Brussels'. While the key policy area in which many on the Leave side wished to regain control from the EU was undoubtedly immigration, with implications this narrative might have for the latter.
Transboundary Environmental Problems
It has become something of a truism that the environment is an area where individual state sovereignty on its own is often powerless to achieve desired environmental outcomes. The environment typically does not respect national borders and, hence, states must act together to see results. This is a longstanding element within the academic literature on the environment and subsidiarity: supranational level action on transboundary environmental problems is justified because one state acting alone cannot tackle an environmental problem without other states also cooperating. 87 Scandinavian acid rain in the 1970s-1980s is often given as an example: it was no use, for example, Sweden acting on its own on acid emissions if the UK's tall power station chimneys were largely responsible for the damage caused. Not surprisingly then, in the end, EU level action was taken to tackle this problem via the Large Combustion Plant (LCP) Directive, 88 which imposed limits on acid gas emissions from power stations. What this example shows is that, in relation to transboundary problems like air pollution, state sovereignty in isolation gets one nowhere and that supranational EU level coordination is likely to produce a more effective pooled sovereignty and control.
International Law Obligations
If Brexit was about regaining sovereignty, a counter-narrative occasionally heard on the Remain side was that the Leave vision of 'pure', untrammelled sovereignty was a myth, in part because the UK 86 Although cf. Neslen, n. 21 above. 87 voluntarily constraining its sovereignty in order to achieve collective action goals, in much the same way as it had done by joining the EU. Reference to these continuing obligations has since become a common feature of the emerging commentary on Brexit and the environment. However, this argument is something of a double-edged sword for environmentalist Remainers. While it rightly picks apart the myth that Brexit will return the UK to a land of 'year zero' unrestrained sovereignty, 90 it at the same time undermines an argument that any action transcending the national level must necessarily emanate from the EU. Indeed, no state can successfully act alone on many environmental issues, and sovereignty must often be constrained in concert with others, but this can introduced to tackle acid rain across Europe and which preceded the EU LCP Directive discussed above -is another example. 94 To be sure, there are some additional advantages to supranational level action over the international: EU rules tend to be more tightly framed than their international equivalents, with concrete timetables for expected compliance, and also benefit from more effective French has noted, post-Brexit, UK environmental lawyers can be expected to turn their attention much more closely to all relevant international law instruments. 96 Future research should look, in particular, at the gaps between EU law provisions and their supposedly equivalent international law counterparts. 97 The UK courts too (aided by creative NGOs and their lawyers), might be expected to play a role in ensuring that international law obligations can be appropriately enforced. See also e.g. Haigh, who makes this point when arguing in favour of the LCP Directive, n. 10 above, at pp. 50-1. However, the point is principally true of old governance-style EU directives. New governance measures, such as the proposed EU Renewables Directive (COM(2016) 767 final), offer a less impressively robust scope for enforcement. 96 French, above n. 89. See also Reid, n. 72 above, who notes that 'The extent of such treaty obligations can be easily overlooked since in recent decades the measures needed to give effect to them have often been introduced into the UK through EU law'. 97 UKELA (The UK Environmental Law Association) is due to produce an international law mapping report later in 2017. ), but its definition of waste -rather unhelpfully for present purposeslinks back to national law 108 and applies only to exports. In that sense it cannot directly replace EU law.
While crafting a common UK definition of waste, and potentially also streamlining it with the EU definition, may be considered on the basis of a product-type, trade justification, another typical subsidiarity justification for federal level action on the environment relates to averting unfair competition between states in a race to the bottom on standards. Such coordination could in theory become more difficult given that Northern Ireland would no longer be subject to the requirements of the Directive and might end up with different standards.
However, the Irish river example is unlikely to give rise to severe problems because of the United Article 21(3) UNWC states:
Watercourse states shall, at the request of any of them, consult with a view to arriving at mutually agreeable measures and methods to prevent, reduce and control pollution of an international watercourse, such as: (a) Setting joint water quality objectives and criteria; (b)
Establishing techniques and practices to address pollution from point and non-point sources;
(c) Establishing lists of substances, the introduction of which into the waters of an international watercourse is to be prohibited, limited, investigated or monitored.
In the Scottish example in contrast, the UNWC would not apply because the Convention only applies between states and not to devolved nations within them. However, some very similar form of crossborder cooperation would be needed.
New Governance and Multi-level Governance
'New governance', a key strand of practice and scholarship within EU law and politics during the previous decade, 115 is also worth considering in relation to issues of control and sovereignty. As diffused across multiple levels, potentially from the local to the international. Therefore, to the extent that states retain a degree of sovereign policy decision-making power over particular EU policy areas like GMOs and renewables above, sovereignty and control exist at more than one level.
Nevertheless, while it is important to point to the overlapping issues of new governance and MLG in order to establish that Brexiteers would be mistaken in thinking of EU environmental policy as an area over which the UK had fully lost control (which needed to be regained),these considerations should not be read as wholesale normative support for such approaches. Where the EU acts in a way that is perceived by the environmental movement as anti-environmental -such as on the subject of GMOs -then of course there will be a temptation to support new governance flexibility for Member
States, as this would allow them to make their own, more ambitious environmental choices.
However, by and large, EU environmental policy is environmentally progressive. In recent years, the MLG governance approach has also been particularly prevalent in the context of the perceived 'governance gap' in relation to climate change. 127 The argument here is that lower governance levels (including cities 128 and states within federal systems like the US) can to some extent make up for the lack of national and international progress on climate change. While this approach has a descriptive accuracy and also a certain normative appeal, one should again be wary of attaching excessive importance to this perspective in relation to Brexit. While lower governance levels provide a much needed supplement to state and international action on climate change, they cannot provide a replacement for action at the latter levels. Thus, in the context of Brexit, the EU and climate change, and indeed environmental law more generally, one needs to beware of fallacious reasoning. The governance gap and the lessons from MLG that modern environmental law
is not all about control at or by one single authority -the state -should not be misinterpreted as validating the proposition that any Brexit-resulting demise of forceful EU action on climate change or, indeed, any subsequent weakening of UK level action in this area, is therefore unproblematic.
CONCLUSION
analysis of the effect of the UK's membership of the EU on the environment. However, this should not be taken as a claim that leaving may, somehow, not be so bad after all. A benefit of using a table like the one presented in the current article is that the balance of positives to negatives can easily be seen. And a glance at the table confirms that there are far more positives than negatives to the UK's existing relationship. The only way to preserve all of these would be by the UK remaining a full member. Given that this seems inconceivable, the second best solution would be an EEA-style soft Brexit or one where (unlike in the Swiss model) the EU insists on a considerable proportion of the environmental acquis being respected as a condition of single market membership. 129 Although the EEA route also seems improbable, the June 2017 UK election result makes some form of soft Brexit a more likely outcome. 130 While these two particular soft Brexit options would not preserve the positive, top right box of Table 1 , they would at least preserve much of the positive, bottom right qualities. However, even with a hard Brexit, given the single market influence, the bottom right and left boxes would not entirely disappear.
In considering issues of sovereignty and control in the specific context of environmental governance, I stressed the importance of the principle of subsidiarity. Effective control over the environment often requires collaboration between states, particularly in the case of transboundary pollution or wildlife migration. While this might involve pooling sovereignty via multilateral or bilateral international agreements rather than via supranational EU level action, the drafting and enforcement advantages of EU law mean that the latter will typically offer the most effective control. It also became clear that Brexit, depending on its eventual shape, is likely to give rise to contestation over environmental sovereignty and control within a devolved UK. In the absence of common EU federal action on the environment post-Brexit, subsidiarity suggests that there will be a need for the UK to create a similar centralized system internally in some areas of environmental policy. However, having fought hard for sovereignty over the environment as a devolved matter, the devolved administrations have already begun to express a degree of hostility towards the idea that
Westminster might take back control at the centre when the EU environmental acquis is repatriated.
In the end then, the environment reveals sovereignty to be much more complicated than many
Brexiteers may have imagined. The UK will still want many of the functions that the EU served in relation to the environment to be carried out. Taking the EU out of the equation simply means that these subsidiarity-justified functions have to be performed elsewhere: via international law cooperation and via central UK control. Pooling UK sovereignty with other states remains necessary for the former; and pooling at least some sovereignty that would otherwise be devolved seems inevitable for the latter.
